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THE RELEVANCE OF TEMPORARY
CHILD CUSTODY ORDERS TO THE
FORMATION OF AN ESTABLISHED
CUSTODIAL ENVIRONMENT: A




Few areas of the law are as turbulent and amorphous as that
concerning child custody, especially in the divorce context. The
adversaries, usually a mother and a father, are caught up in
much more than a child custody dispute. Parents react emotion-
ally rather than rationally. Regardless of the desirability of di-
vorce, their lives and identities are uncertain. They necessarily
look at their child's interests through the fog of their own emo-
tions. Children often face the unfamiliar courtroom setting with
only vague ideas of what is happening; because of their age or
psychological state, many children cannot express their interests
to the court. The judge in a child custody dispute is placed in an
awkward position. Gathering evidence about which custody al-
ternative will be in the child's best interests is difficult because
it requires the judge to anticipate future results. The court must
sift through the truths and half-truths presented in the parents'
testimony, which will comprise the bulk of the evidence. In de-
ciding what is best for a particular child, there often is no easy
answer. Even when both parties are good parents a decision
must be made.
Much of the ambiguity and turmoil inherent in child custody
battles during a divorce has been alleviated by Michigan's Child
Custody Act of 1970.1 The statute enumerates eleven factors
that a court must consider when evaluating a child's best inter-
ests.2 Another statutory provision establishes the evidentiary
burden on a parent seeking to modify a child custody order.' In
* Contributing Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 23,
1990. B.A., University of Colorado, 1987; J.D., University of Michigan, 1990.
1. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.21-.29 (West Supp..1989).
2. Id. § 722.23.
3. Id. § 722.27(1)(c). The statute provides:
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cases where the court finds that the child has an established cus-
todial environment with the custodial parent, a more stringent
standard applies.4 In these situations, a noncustodial parent
must show by clear and convincing evidence the necessity of
modifying a custody arrangement.' The stricter standard pro-
vides continuity for the child and custodial parent: once a final
order has been issued, both may develop a relationship free of
uncertainty as to its permanence.
Typically, section 722.27(1)(c) ("the modification provision")
applies when a noncustodial parent wishes to change custody
several months or even years after the judgment of divorce and
the final custody order have been entered. Nevertheless, the
modification provision can also be applied in situations that are
less typical and less appropriate. For example, courts may im-
pose this higher evidentiary burden on challenges to a tempo-
rary custody determination that are made prior to the final di-
vorce and custody decision.' In such cases, application of the
modification provision with its stricter standard is improper be-
cause the custody arrangement is intended to be temporary. Ap-
plication of this higher evidentiary burden forces parents to con-
test the temporary order or risk losing custody of their child
permanently. Neither the parents nor the legal system is pre-
pared for this dilemma: it exacerbates an unstable situation and
trivializes the permanent custody hearings which will follow.
This Note presents a Model Statute that clearly indicates
when a court may find that an established custodial environ-
ment has arisen out of a temporary custody order. The Model
Statute thus clarifies when it is appropriate to apply the clear
and convincing evidentiary standard to situations involving tem-
(1) If a child custody dispute has been submitted to the circuit court as an origi-
nal action under this act or has arisen incidentally from another action in the
circuit court or an order or judgment of the circuit court, for the best interests of
the child the court may:
(c) Modify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause shown
or because of change of circumstances until the child reaches 18 years of age.
The court shall not modify or amend its previous judgments or orders or issue a
new order so as to change the established custodial environment of a child un-
less there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best inter-
est of the child. The custodial environment of a child is established if over an
appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment
for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort. The age of
the child, the physical environment, and the inclination of the custodian and the
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porary child custody orders. Part I of this Note describes the
court's use of temporary custody orders to determine whether an
established custodial environment exists. Part II sets forth the
Model Statute, which integrates current case law into statutory
language designed specifically for temporary custody situations.
Part II also analyzes each section of the Model Statute, present-
ing the case law that guides each provision and discussing the
advantages that the Model Statute provides over the existing
law.
I. CREATION OF AN ESTABLISHED CUSTODIAL ENVIRONMENT
FROM A TEMPORARY CUSTODY ORDER
In the early stages of a custody dispute, a temporary custody
order may ensure continuity in the parent-child relationship.
Parents can gain time for discovery and preparation of a legal
case, to explore their feelings about custody, and to evaluate
their ability to provide emotional and material support as single
parents. These benefits could accrue without either parent feel-
ing a need to fight the custody order. Its revocability protects
both parents and allows them to present a full case at the final
hearing stage. However, the benefits of a temporary custody or-
der can be destroyed if a court treats the arrangement as an es-
tablished one. 7 As a result, a temporary order, while technically
revocable, may become permanent in practice. This will force
parents to fight for temporary custody before there has been an
opportunity for discovery and often before the parents have
been able to think rationally about their child's future. In addi-
tion, it discourages alternative dispute resolution such as media-
tion because the party with temporary custody may not view ju-
dicial resolution as a gamble.
A. The Michigan Child Custody Provisions
The Child Custody Act of 1970 ("the Act") created greater
uniformity in judicial decision making in child custody cases. 8
The Act provides a clearer standard for determining custody
disputes by requiring judges to analyze the child's best inter-
7. See supra p. 2.
8. See MICH. COMp. LAWs ANN. §§ 722.21-.29 (West Supp. 1989).
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ests.9 This general child custody standard contains eleven fac-
tors that a court must consider in determining the best interests
of the child.'" The court must make specific written findings on
each factor." Failure to consider a single factor can result in an
order being overturned on appeal.'
2
Section 722.27(1)(c) of,the Act governs modifications of child
custody orders. This section provides that a court shall not mod-
ify a previous child custody order to change the established cus-
todial environment of the child unless clear and convincing evi-
dence establishes that the modification is in the best interests of
the child.' 3 The court applies the clear and convincing standard
where its order would change the established custodial environ-
ment of the child, regardless of whether the case presents a
modification of a prior order or a situation where a single parent
custody arrangement developed without legal intervention. "
The statute defines a custodial environment as:
established if over an appreciable time the child natu-
rally looks to the custodian in that environment for guid-
ance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental com-
fort. The age of the child, the physical environment, and
the inclination of the custodian and the child as to per-
manency of the relationship shall also be considered.' 5
The higher threshold promotes stability within a child's life and
protects the child against continuous changes in custody be-
tween divorced parents.' 6 The stricter evidentiary standard pro-
9. See id. § 722.25.
10. Id. § 722.23. These factors include the love, affection, and other emotional ties
existing between the parties and the child; the capacity of the parties to provide love and
guidance, as well as material needs; the permanence of the proposed custodial environ-
ment; the mental and physical health of the parties; the child's preference; and the will-
ingness of each party to facilitate contact between the child and the other party. Id.
11. See Williamson v. Williamson, 122 Mich. App. 667, 672, 333 N.W.2d 6, 8 (1982).
12. Id.
13. MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.27(l)(c) (West Supp. 1989). Courts and practition-
ers have generally interpreted a showing of the child's best interests for an initial cus-
tody order to require a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 411
Mich. 567, 582, 309 N.W.2d 532, 537 (1981); Lewis v. Lewis, 138 Mich. App. 191, 193, 360
N.W.2d 170, 171 (1984).
14. In most divorce cases, an established custodial environment has been created
within the family, but not exclusively with either parent. During the marriage, both par-
ents performed some caretaking functions and the child learned to depend upon both for
love and guidance. Clear and convincing evidence, on the other hand, is only needed
where one parent has established an exclusive custodial relationship.
15. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.27(1)(c) (West Supp. 1989).
16. For an analysis of the importance of continuity to a child's development, see J.
GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973).
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vides continuity for a child after the court has entered a perma-
nent custody order.
These benefits, however, do not accrue if the court finds that
an established custodial environment has resulted from a tempo-
rary custody order, possibly uncontested by one party in a di-
vorce action. In the absence of a court finding that an estab-
lished custodial environment had arisen out of a temporary
custody order, the parent seeking custody would only have to
show by a preponderance of evidence that the requested custody
was in the child's best interests."7 A slight advantage in favor of
the parent seeking custody would usually be sufficient. But if
the court finds an established custodial environment, the parent
seeking custody must prove the need for change by clear and
convincing evidence.
Although the decisions of Michigan courts do not create a co-
herent body of law, judicial precedent in the state suggests that
the modification provision with its higher evidentiary burden
has been, and will continue to be, applied to custody arrange-
ments arising from a temporary order.'8 This practice is in need
of statutory reform.' 9
B. The Effect of Temporary Custody Orders in Determining
the Existence of an Established Custodial Environment in
Michigan
To understand the treatment of temporary custody orders
under the modification provision, it is first necessary to under-
stand the process followed by courts in dealing with custody
modifications. Courts are expected to analyze every custody dis-
pute in terms of whether an established custodial environment
has been created.2 In most cases, neither parent will have devel-
17. See supra note 13.
18. See Underwood v. Underwood, 163 Mich. App. 383, 414 N.W.2d 171 (1987);
Wealton v. Wealton, 120 Mich. App. 406, 327 N.W.2d 493 (1982); Blaskowski v. Blaskow-
ski, 115 Mich. App. 1, 320 N.W.2d 268 (1982).
19. Application of the modification statute to temporary orders demands a full pres-
entation of available evidence at the temporary stage. The parent who wins temporary
custody will face a distinct advantage when the permanent order is litigated. Hence, both
parents will try to gain this advantage, rather than treating the temporary order as an
interim order of minimal significance. Section 722.27 (1)(c) encourages parents to fight
for temporary custody decisions, a practice that is harmful to the child and to the par-
ents' continuing relationship with each other. After receiving temporary custody, the
custodial parent can benefit by drawing out the-process as long as possible in order to
develop an established environment before the final hearing.
20. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.27, 722.23(d) (West Supp. 1989).
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oped an exclusive relationship with the child, and the court will
apply the best interests balancing test." In cases where the
court finds that an established custodial environment has been
created, it will apply the stricter evidentiary standard."s Thus,
the court must first determine whether a change of custody
would disrupt an established custodial relationship. If such a re-
lationship does exist, the court must then ask whether the dis-
ruption is necessary. The requesting party must prove the neces-
sity of the change with clear and convincing evidence.
These steps, however, do not provide clear guidance. Applica-
tion of the clear and convincing standard lacks uniformity and
predictability" because each judge has great discretion in deter-
mining when an established custodial environment exists. The
application of the modification provision depends too much
upon the judge's analysis of the intangibles involved in a family
relationship.
As a result, temporary custody orders can improperly provide
the basis for a court to find an established custodial environ-
ment. It is essential that courts carefully examine these tempo-
rary arrangements to determine whether an established custo-
dial environment actually exists. One example of a court doing
so is found in Underwood v. Underwood.24 The court granted
the father custody of the child by an ex parte interim order.25
This arrangement continued for approximately two-and-a-half
years, during which time the mother maintained a relationship
21. In Stringer v. Vincent, 161 Mich. App. 429, 411 N.W.2d 474 (1987), the Michigan
Court of Appeals noted that in those cases in which an established custodial relationship
does not exist, the trial court "may modify a custody order if the petitioning party can
produce enough proof to convince the trial court by a preponderance of the evidence that
it should give custody to the petitioner." Id. at 435, 411 N.W.2d at 477. The court must
balance the eleven factors comprising the child's best interests. The necessity of the cus-
tody decision is assumed because the court is not concerned with disrupting an estab-
lished relationship.
22. An explanation of the stricter evidentiary burden can be found in Stringer, id. at
434, 411 N.W.2d at 477. Stringer involved a petition to change the custody order granted
in a judgment of divorce. The court stated:
The first step in deciding any child custody dispute is to determine if there ex-
ists an established custodial environment. The Child Custody Act requires that a
court refrain from changing custody if it would change the established custodial
environment, unless presented with clear and convincing evidence that such
change is in the best interests of the child.
Id. (citations omitted).
23. See, e.g., Breas v. Breas, 149 Mich. App. 103, 385 N.W.2d 743 (1986); Curless v.
Curless, 137 Mich. App. 673, 357 N.W.2d 921 (1984); Blaskowski v. Blaskowski, 115
Mich. App. 1, 320 N.W.2d 268 (1982).
24. 163 Mich. App. 383, 414 N.W.2d 171 (1987).
25. Id. at 384, 414 N.W.2d at 172.
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with her son, visiting him at the father's home.26 The mother
filed a counterclaim for divorce and permanent custody shortly
after the court entered the interim order, but did not actively
pursue it for two years." The circuit court granted permanent
custody to the mother.2 8 The court of appeals remanded for a
determination of whether a permanent custodial environment
had been established.2 9 The court held that a temporary custody
order in itself was not enough to establish a custodial
environment."
Although the Underwood court stated that a temporary order
alone cannot form a custodial relationship sufficient to impose
the clear and convincing standard, the case suggests that behav-
ior of the parties following a temporary order could be used to
establish such a relationship. In its decision, the court noted
that the father was living with relatives and dependent upon
them for money in a situation that was clearly temporary. 1 The
record below was unclear as to the guidance, discipline, and ma-
terial necessities provided by both the mother and father.12 It
seems likely that the court would have found a custodial envi-
ronment with the father if there had been a more stable home
environment and regular employment.
The court of appeals also considered whether an established
custodial environment can be created from a temporary custody
order in Wealton v. Wealton.3 3 In that case, the trial court
awarded custody of three children to the mother. Seven years
later, by stipulation, the court granted the father temporary cus-
tody of the youngest son for the summer. At the end of the sum-
mer, the father filed a petition seeking permanent custody of
that child.34 The trial court made no finding concerning the cus-
todial environment. 5 Instead, it simply placed the burden on
the father to prove the necessity of a custody change by clear
and convincing evidence.36 On review, the court of appeals held
that "[t]he court cannot presume an established custodial envi-
ronment by reference only to a custody order, but must look to
26. See id. at 385-87, 414 N.W.2d at 173.
27. Id. at 384-85, 414 N.W.2d at 172.
28. Id. at 384, 414 N.W.2d at 172.
29. Id. at 393, 414 N.W.2d at 176.
30. Id. at 392, 414 N.W.2d at 175.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 393, 414 N.W.2d at 176.
33. 120 Mich. App. 406, 327 N.W.2d 493 (1982).
34. Id. at 408, 327 N.W.2d at 494.
35. Id. at 409, 327 N.W.2d at 494.
36. Id.
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the actual circumstances of each case."' 37 The court said that de-
termination as to the existence of an established custodial envi-
ronment was necessary because the child had lived with his fa-
ther for a significant amount of time: "The fact that a custody
order is labeled 'permanent' or 'temporary' does not eliminate
the requirement that the established custodial environment be
determined."3 8 Thus, the court of appeals held that a temporary
order may only be one factor considered when judges analyze
the current custodial relationship.
In contrast to the clarity of Wealton, the court of appeals es-
tablished more ambiguous precedent in Blaskowski v. Blaskow-
ski,-9 where temporary custody of the minor child was awarded
to the defendant mother. The court then granted permanent
custody to the father. The mother appealed. 0 The trial court
had held that the clear and convincing evidenciary standard did
not apply where the custodial environment was created by a
temporary order:
[A]lthough the statute does seem to apply [the clear and
convincing standard] to any order of the court, . .. it
would be an anomaly to apply it to a hearing that was
necessitated by a physical separation of the parties
before there was an adequate chance for the court and
the friend of the court and the parties to prepare all their
investigative resources for a full and complete hearing on
the merits.41
The trial court emphasized the need for more discovery and for
a transitory custody period before the final court hearings.42
On appeal, the court suggested that the elements of an estab-
lished custodial environment can develop whenever one parent
has custody of the child for an extended period of time.43 The
court found that whether the custody is pursuant to a perma-
nent or temporary custody order is irrelevant.44 According to the
court, labeling an order as temporary should not prevent the
creation of an established environment because disruption of a
37. Id. at 410, 327 N.W.2d at 495.
38. Id.
39. 115 Mich. App. 1, 320 N.W.2d 268 (1982).
40. Id. at 3, 320 N.W.2d at 269.
41. Id. at 5, 320 N.W.2d at 270.
42. Id. at 5, 7, 320 N.W.2d at 270.
43. Id. at 5, 320 N.W.2d at 270 (quoting Berman v. Berman, 84 Mich. App. 740, 747-
48, 270 N.W.2d 680, 684 (1978)).
44. Id. at 6, 320 N.W.2d at 270.
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custodial relationship created after issuance of a temporary or-
der can be as devastating to the child as the disruption of one
created by a permanent order.45 In sum, the Blaskowski court
found that an established custodial environment can be created
through a relationship arising from a temporary order, but that
the existence of a temporary order alone does not create this
environment.
Blaskowski effectively strengthens custodial environments cre-
ated by temporary orders. Although Blaskowski does not say
that a temporary custody order automatically creates an estab-
lished custodial environment, the case indicates judicial ap-
proval for upholding relationships arising from temporary or-
ders. More importantly, it places the burden on the noncustodial
parent to prevent the creation of a custodial relationship. It sug-
gests that a temporary custody order, if left in place for a signifi-
cant amount of time, can become an established custodial
environment.
Blaskowski also clearly indicates that procedural fairness is-
sues raised by parents have no impact on the custodial environ-
ment determination. The court of appeals in Blaskowski ad-
dressed-and dispensed with-claims of unfairness to the
noncustodial parent in allowing use of temporary orders in this
manner: "[T]he Legislature has decided that the best interests
of the child prevail over procedural fairness to the parents and
that the best interests of the child generally require continuance
of an established custodial environment."4 The court concluded
that "[t]rial courts and parties should endeavor to avoid having
custody pursuant to a temporary order ripen into an established
custodial environment by expediting the progress of contested
custody cases to trial." 7 The court naively suggests that parties
should act quickly to avoid the development of a custodial envi-
ronment, although often the judicial system prevents this. Par-
ties cannot control crowded court dockets and other facets of the
legal system which necessarily slow down resolution of their
cases. The court also failed to specify the minimum time neces-
sary to establish a custodial environment, leaving this to the dis-
cretion of other judges and leaving parents with an undefined
sense of urgency.
After Blaskowski embraced the extended time period ap-
proach for finding an established custodial environment and en-
45. Id. at 6-7, 320 N.W.2d at 270.
46. Id. at 7, 320 N.W.2d at 271.
47. Id.
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dorsed the use of temporary orders in this effort, the court of
appeals has in some instances opted for a different mode of
analysis."' Several decisions have relied on case-by-case scrutiny
to determine whether a custodial environment exists. For exam-
ple, in DeVries v. DeVries,49 the court held that the existence of
a temporary order does not remove the court's responsibility for
determining whether an established custodial environment ex-
ists.5 0 In Breas v. Breas,51 the court interpreted Blaskowski as
allowing case-by-case analysis rather than a rigid application of
the clear and convincing evidentiary standard for all relation-
ships created by temporary order.2
The case-by-case approach preferred in these subsequent deci-
sions limits the power of a temporary order to create an estab-
lished custodial environment, but it also provides little guidance
for parents and attorneys trying to predict the influence of tem-
porary custody orders. The flaws in Blaskowski and the ambigu-
ity of later decisions interpreting Blaskowski point to the need
for a more uniform approach to the effect of temporary custody
orders in custody decisions.
II. A MODEL STATUTE FOR CONSIDERATION OF TEMPORARY
CUSTODY ORDERS
As long as the determination of established custodial environ-
ments in the postdivorce setting is left exclusively to the courts,
48. DeVries v. DeVries, 163 Mich. App. 266, 413 N.W.2d 764 (1987); Breas v. Breas,
149 Mich. App. 103, 385 N.W.2d 743 (1986).
49. 163 Mich. App. 266, 413 N.W.2d 764 (1987).
50. Id. at 271, 413 N.W.2d at 766. The court found that a custodial environment had
been established with the mother because the children had lived most of their lives with
their mother on the family farm and had a stable life there. Id. The custodial environ-
ment was established not by the temporary order, but by the quality of the relationship
between the mother and children.
51. 149 Mich. App. 103, 385 N.W.2d 743 (1986).
52. Id. at 107, 385 N.W.2d at 745. In Breas, the court awarded temporary custody to
the mother. Almost a year later, the trial court found that no established custodial envi-
ronment existed and awarded joint legal custody with physical custody in the father. Id.
at 105, 385 N.W.2d at 744. The mother appealed, claiming that the judge presumed that
no custodial environment could exist because the initial custody order was temporary.
Id. at 106, 385 N.W.2d at 744. The appellate court held that, "[in fact, the trial judge
properly stated that the temporary custody order did not, by itself, establish the custo-
dial environment. He expressly acknowledged that he was required to assess all the fac-
tors in the statute." Id. at 106, 385 N.W.2d at 745. The court further held that the trial
judge had applied the Blaskowski doctrine properly: "He did not disregard our decision
in Blaskowski v. Blaskowski by focusing only on the 'temporary' nature of the original
custody order and failing to assess the factual situation based on the statutory factors."
Id. at 107, 385 N.W.2d at 745 (footnote omitted).
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judges are apt to make custodial environment determinations
unevenly. Even prior decisions that treat a temporary order as
inconclusive can be distinguished by later courts based on fac-
tual differences. It seems unlikely that a uniform and reliable
strategy for applying the established custodial environment test
will come from the courts.
Because of this judicial ambiguity, legislative reform is essen-
tial. An even application of the test would protect parents and
children from unnecessary turmoil and clarify the intangibles in-
volved in the creation of an established custodial environment.
Parents and family law attorneys need to be able to forecast ac-
curately what will influence a court's decisions regarding cus-
tody. Judges need a coherent standard to apply in every case.
While some case-by-case analysis will always be necessary in
child custody situations, greater legislative guidance would iden-
tify key factors needed to create a custodial environment. As
with the best interests standard of section 722.23,11 judges
should be required to analyze and make findings on a series of
factors before determining whether a custodial environment
exists.
A. Proposed Model Statute
In order to ensure judicial uniformity in interpretation of tem-
porary custody orders when determining whether an established
custodial environment exists, the Michigan Legislature should
amend the Child Custody Act to include this proposed section:
Be it enacted:
In custody disputes arising from divorce, the court
may find that an established custodial environment
was created by a relationship arising through a tempo-
rary custody order of the court only after considering,
evaluating, and determining the sum total of the fol-
lowing factors:
(a) The parties' awareness of and treatment of the
relationship as established;
(b) Any court-ordered review of the temporary cus-
tody order;
(c) The amount of time that has passed within the
temporary environment;
53. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (West Supp. 1989).
WINTER 19901
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(d) Visitation by the noncustodial parent;
(e) Any other factors incident to the divorce that
may have detracted from the stability and per-
manence of the established relationship, includ-
ing, but not limited to, emotional disorder and
geographic moves.
The Model Statute is designed to identify distinct factors
needing consideration in determining the existence of an estab-
lished custodial environment, while allowing some judicial dis-
cretion. It also aims to distinguish challenges to temporary cus-
tody orders from requests for custody modifications after a
divorce is final, which require clear and convincing evidentiary
proof of necessity.
Factors (a)-(d) specifically limit the circumstances under
which an established environment can be found to have devel-
oped. To some degree, the factors serve as a guide to parties
seeking to prevent the development of an established custodial
environment. For example, a noncustodial parent can use visita-
tion privileges to maintain a relationship with the child with the
knowledge that the court will consider this factor.
Some judges may claim that this statute is unduly burden-
some because it requires detailed analysis of a greater number of
factors than is presently required. But application of this provi-
sion should be no more burdensome than assessment of the best
interest factors required under section 722.23. The same type of
specific findings are required under the best interests standard.
With the greater guidance provided by the Model Statute, the
outcome of child custody cases should become more predictable.
Interested parties can use the Model Statute to estimate the
likelihood that a specific temporary arrangement will result in
an established custodial environment. Most typical divorce cus-
tody disputes will not implicate all of the Model Statute factors.
In these cases, a court would not impose the clear and convinc-
ing standard against the parent without temporary custody.
Only in unusual situations-for example, where the custodial
parent's relationship with the child is enhanced by other fac-
tors-would an established custodial environment be found.
[VOL. 23:2
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B. Analysis of the Model Statute Factors in the Context of
Michigan Case Law
The Model Statute seeks to incorporate and unify Michigan
case law relating to modification of custody. Prior decisions have
often been based upon individual circumstances rather than any
overarching principle. Although the outcomes may have been
beneficial to individuals involved, they have not provided guid-
ance for future disputes. The statute furnishes a uniformity
lacking in the prior cases and builds upon these past decisions.
Each section of the Statute draws from Michigan case law, tying
the factual differences together into a single standard.
1. Awareness and treatment of a relationship as estab-
lished- The factor that assesses awareness and treatment of a
relationship as established adopts an approach taken by several
courts which have looked at the intent and knowledge of the
parties to determine whether an established custodial relation-
ship has been created. The premise is that an established rela-
tionship cannot develop if all parties consider the arrangement
to be of limited duration. One case recognizing the importance
of the subjective intent of the parties is Curless v. Curless,5"
where the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a temporary cus-
tody order does not guarantee an established custodial environ-
ment.5 5 Examining the specific facts of the case to determine the
nature of the relationship,5 6 the court considered two important
factors: the father's statement that he was going to contest cus-
tody at the time of the temporary award and the amount of time
the children spent with their father.5 The court found that the
temporary relationship was not stable, and that the children
were aware that the custody arrangement was temporary. 8
Thus, the court held that no custodial environment had been
established.
Similar precedent is found in Vander Molen v. Vander
Molen.5 9 During divorce proceedings, the plaintiff mother filed
for and was awarded temporary custody of the parties' four chil-
dren. The defendant filed objections to this decision." At the
trial level, the mother argued that she had been the primary
54. 137 Mich. App. 673, 357 N.W.2d 921 (1984).
55. Id. at 656, 357 N.W.2d at 923.
56. Id. at 675-76, 357 N.W.2d at 923.
57. Id. at 677, 357 N.W.2d at 923.
58. Id., 357 N.W.2d at 924.
59. 164 Mich. App. 448, 418 N.W.2d 108 (1987).
60. Id., 418 N.W.2d at 109.
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caretaker for the children before the divorce."' Additionally, she
claimed that the father's long work hours prevented him from
spending time with the children. The father denied all allega-
tions of neglect.2  A Friend of the Court 3 employee testified
that the girl had indicated a preference to remain with her
mother, while the oldest boy wanted to live with his father. The
other two boys were too young to state a preference.6 4
The trial court found that an established custodial environ-
ment existed with the mother for only one child, the daughter.
No such environment was found for the three remaining boys
and permanent custody was awarded to their father.6 5 The trial
court supported its findings:
"[W]e would observe that under the statute a custodial
environment becomes established .. .when . . . the af-
fected parents and the children view it as an established
custodial environment or treat it as a custodial environ-
ment in terms of their conduct and their attitude toward
each other and desire that relationship to continue." 6
This subjective standard was upheld by the appellate court,
which stated that the conduct and attitudes of the parents and
child must be scrutinized to determine whether an established
custodial environment exists.6 7
61. Id. at 452, 418 N.W.2d at 110.
62. Id. at 453, 418 N.W.2d at 110.
63. The Friend of the Court is a Michigan agency of the circuit court. MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 552.503 (West 1988). The Friend of the Court was created by statute to aid
the court in resolving domestic cases, and often makes custody recommendations to the
court after meeting with both parents. Id. §§ 552.501, 552.503.
64. Vander Molen v. Vander Molen, 164 Mich. App. 448, 452, 418 N.W.2d 108, 110
(1987).
65. Id. at 453, 418 N.W.2d at 110.
66. Id. at 457, 418 N.W.2d at 112.
67. Id. Vander Molen suggests that if the parties, or at least one of the parties, do
not view the order as permanent, then a custodial environment cannot be established.
Yet Sedlar v. Sedlar, 165 Mich. App. 71, 419 N.W.2d 18 (1987), a case decided a month
after Vander Molen, tempers this analysis. In Sedlar, the plaintiff mother was awarded
temporary and ultimately permanent custody of her minor daughter following the par-
ties' divorce. Id. at 73, 419 N.W.2d at 18. Nine months later, the mother asked the father
to take custody of the child while she resolved problems in a new relationship, and con-
sented to a new order giving custody to the father. A month after that, the mother peti-
tioned for a change of custody. Id., 419 N.W.2d at 19. A court referee found that an
established custodial environment existed with the father and denied the change. Id. at
74, 419 N.W.2d at 19. The mother appealed, claiming that because she understood the
change to be temporary, a custodial environment could not have resulted. Id. at 75, 419
N.W.2d at 19. The court held that "the change in custody order did not explicitly indi-
cate that it was for a temporary amount of time." Id. at 76, 419 N.W.2d at 20. Legal
custody was changed by the agreement. Id. The court found that a custodial environ-
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2. Court-ordered review- The court-ordered review factor
in the Model Statute provides a safeguard for parents in a tem-
porary custody situation. By determining that review of a cus-
tody arrangement is essential, a court recognizes the possible
temporary nature of the environment. A court may order review
because of facts indicating that the temporary arrangement may
not be stable or beneficial to the child. Review underscores the
impermanence of the custodial environment in the minds of the
parties, and allows temporary placement when the court is una-
ble to foresee the outcome with certainty.
In Becker v. Becker,6 s for example, the father was awarded
custody of the child with an automatic review in six months. Af-
ter the review, custody was changed to the mother. On appeal,
the father claimed that a custodial environment had been estab-
lished and that the court improperly ignored section
722.27(1)(c). 9 In rejecting the father's arguments, the appellate
court emphasized that automatic review had been ordered by
the original trial court: "Under the facts of this case, particularly
in view of the automatic review which the trial judge provided
for in the divorce judgment, it cannot be urged persuasively that
in the interval a permanent custodial environment had been es-
tablished."'70 Thus, automatic review can be treated as prima fa-
cie proof that there is no established relationship.
3. Amount of time passed within the temporary environ-
ment- The factor assessing the amount of time that has passed
under a temporary order recognizes that the element of time is a
strong safeguard for parents seeking to avoid creation of an es-
tablished custodial environment. According to section
722.27(1)(c), a custodial environment must be established "over
an appreciable time."71 As a result, a noncustodial parent has an
interest in speedy resolution of a custody dispute to prevent the
formation of an established custodial environment, while the
custodial parent may seek to lengthen the procedure, hoping
that an appreciable period of time will pass before the final ad-
ment was established with the father as of the date of the entry of the new agreement.
Id. at 77, 419 N.W.2d at 20. As the order was not expressly limited, the mother's intent
that it be temporary was not sufficient. Id.
This case can be distinguished from most divorce cases because a temporary order will
obviously be labeled as such by the court. There can rarely be confusion over whether an
order immediately following a divorce is intended to be temporary or permanent.
68. 95 Mich. App. 370, 290 N.W.2d 149 (1980).
69. Id. at 373, 290 N.W.2d at 151.
70. Id. at 374, 290 N.W.2d at 151.
71. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27(1)(c) (West Supp. 1989).
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judication. The time factor in the Model Statute ensures that
courts will scrutinize this issue.
One example of time in a temporary environment being criti-
cal in a custody dispute is Meyer v. Meyer,71 where the trial
court granted temporary custody of two boys to their mother.
Permanent physical custody was granted to the father with legal
custody vested in the Friend of the Court.7 After a rehearing,
physical custody of one child was changed to the mother with
legal custody remaining in the Friend of the Court.74 The trial
judge made no findings as to an established custodial environ-
ment, but on review the appellate court concluded that none ex-
isted. 75 The court stated: "We do not believe that either of the
three-month periods constituted an 'appreciable' period of time
which would support a finding that an established custodial en-
vironment existed as to either party. '76 The court concluded
that these periods were unstable and did not result in the chil-
dren turning to either parent primarily "for 'guidance, disci-
pline, the necessities of life and parental comfort.' ,,77
Neither prior decisions nor the Model Statute specifically de-
fine appreciable time. This concept is impossible to define pre-
cisely because its definition must vary with the age and emo-
tional make-up of the child and the interaction with both
parents.7 The individual nature of each custody dispute will
cause the appreciable time to vary depending upon the facts.
The Model Statute does not define appreciable time; it requires
the court to make precise findings regarding time spent in the
environment and to consider this factor in deciding whether a
custodial environment has been established.
4. Visitation- The Model Statute factor requiring court re-
view of visitation by the noncustodial parent recognizes that vis-
itation is a powerful tool with which the noncustodial parent can
prevent the creation of an established custodial environment.
Frequent visitation prevents a child from developing the com-
plete attachment to only one parent required by the established
custodial environment definition in section 722.27(1)(c).
79
72. 153 Mich. App. 419, 395 N.W.2d 65 (1986).
73. Id. at 421, 395 N.W.2d at 66.
74. Id. at 422, 395 N.W.2d at 66.
75. Id. at 423, 395 N.W.2d at 67.
76. Id. at 424, 395 N.W.2d at 67.
77. Id. (quoting MicH. COMP. LAWS § 722.27(c) (1979)).
78. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 16.
79. Cf. Baker v. Baker, 411 Mich. 567, 579-80, 309 N.W.2d 532 (1981) (describing the
physical and psychological characteristics of an established custodial environment).
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For example, time spent with the children was an important
factor in Schwiesow v. Schwiesow.80 The Michigan Court of Ap-
peals analyzed the mother's absence from the child before the
divorce and found that her absence had contributed to the de-
velopment of a custodial environment.81 Under a similar analy-
sis, parents who fail to visit, even through no fault of their own,
may find that an established custodial environment has devel-
oped in their absence. Parents who visit regularly can argue that
the child still looks to them for support. Visitation may also be a
sign that the parties are aware of the temporary nature of the
relationship.
5. Other factors incident to the divorce that may detract
from the stability of the relationship- Because divorce in-
volves change and turmoil, judges must look into this confusion
to determine the stability of the parent-child relationship. The
fifth Model Statute factor allows judges to exercise discretion in
examining other factors in a particular divorce in addition to as-
sessing the four factors required in all temporary custody cases.
This provides some room for discretionary determinations with-
out allowing discretion to define totally the custodial
environment.
a. Example of a discretionary factor: special divorce cir-
cumstances- An example of the exercise of discretion by a
court in a case with special circumstances is found in Baker v.
Baker. 2 The case involved a custody dispute between two di-
vorced parents.8 3 No custody order had been entered at the time
of the divorce, but both parents had agreed that the two chil-
dren should live with the mother. 4 Several months after the
mother and children moved to Colorado, the father physically
removed one child from the mother's custody and received a
temporary custody order from the court." One month later, the
trial court awarded custody of both children to the mother."6
Upon review, the Michigan Supreme Court held that an estab-
lished custodial environment had not existed with the father.8
For guidance, it relied upon the legislative intent to prevent dis-
ruptive and unwarranted custody changes.88 The court stated
80. 159 Mich. App. 548, 406 N.W.2d 878 (1987). See infra Part II.B.5.b.
81. Id. at 556-57, 406 N.W.2d at 881.
82. 411 Mich. 567, 309 N.W.2d 532 (1981).
83. Id. at 572, 309 N.W.2d at 532.
84. Id. at 574, 309 N.W.2d at 533.
85. Id. at 574-75, 309 N.W.2d at 533.
86. Id. at 575, 309 N.W.2d at 534.
87. Id. at 582, 309 N.W.2d at 537.
88. Id. at 576-77, 309 N.W.2d at 534-35.
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that the legislature intended that custody should be modified
only in compelling situations.8 9 In dismissing the effect of the
temporary custody orders, the court found that:
[Tihe orders of custody .. .did not, of themselves, es-
tablish the custodial environment with which we are con-
cerned here. Such an environment depended instead
upon a custodial relationship of a significant duration in
which [the child] was provided the parental care, disci-
pline, love, guidance and attention appropriate to his age
and individual needs; an environment in both the physi-
cal and psychological sense in which the relationship be-
tween the custodian and the child is marked by qualities
of security, stability and permanence.9
The father contended that a custodial environment was estab-
lished in Michigan because the child had lived there from birth
until the divorce.9 The court rejected that assertion: "Certainly
those repeated custodial changes and geographical moves, with
the necessarily attendant emotional implications, destroyed the
previously established custodial environment in which the boy
was living and precluded the establishment of a new one, at least
until after the trial."9 ' When the child returned to Michigan
with his father, a new custodial relationship was established
from which a new custodial environment could have-but had
not yet-grown.
Baker points to some of the difficulties that arise in creating
an established custodial environment out of a temporary custody
relationship. Assessing those kinds of issues should be left to the
discretion of the court. The emotional turmoil stemming from
the geographical moves in the postdivorce period may prevent
development of this environment even if there is a fairly long
time period between the temporary and permanent orders. A
child is unlikely to look to one parent for support and guidance
if the family life remains disrupted and unstable. Parents cannot
devote the required emotional energy needed to establish a cus-
todial relationship when both their lifestyle and their child's
lifestyle seem impermanent.
b. Example of a discretionary factor: parent-child relation-
ships during marriage- Some courts seeking to determine the
89. Id. at 577, 309 N.W.2d at 535.
90. Id. at 579-80, 309 N.W.2d at 536.
91. Id. at 578, 309 N.W.2d at 535.
92. Id. at 581, 309 N.W.2d at 536.
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existence of a custodial environment have examined the parent-
child relationships that existed prior to divorce. This is another
area that should be left to judicial discretion. A strong and
nearly exclusive relationship between the child and one parent
may facilitate the development.of an established custodial envi-
ronment after the divorce. In Schwiesow v. Schwiesow, for ex-
ample, the plaintiff mother was away from the father and two
children for significant amounts of time prior to the divorce
while she finished her education and recovered from serious in-
juries from a car accident 3 During this time, the children lived
with their father on the family farm."4 The permanent order
granted joint legal custody with physical custody to alternate be-
tween parents annually. 5 The father appealed the permanent
order, arguing that he had established a custodial environment
for the children. 6
The Michigan Court of Appeals found that a custodial envi-
ronment had been established with the father." The mother's
absences from the home before the divorce and the father's role
of primary caretaker during this period played a large part in
this decision:9 "We examine the circumstances surrounding the
care of the two minor children in the years immediately preced-
ing the divorce trial to determine whether they were being cared
for in an established custodial environment."99
Although the Schwiesow situation appears unique enough to
mandate this scrutiny into the marriage to determine the exis-
tence of a custodial environment, Schwiesow and Mazurkiewicz
v. Mazurkiewicz00 both appear to contradict the Baker court's
statements that a custodial environment must begin anew after
a substantial change in the family situation such as divorce. 101
93. 159 Mich. App. 548, 556, 406 N.W.2d 878, 881 (1987).
94. Id. at 552, 406 N.W.2d at 879.
95. Id. at 554, 406 N.W.2d at 880.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 556, 406 N.W.2d at 881.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 557, 406 N.W.2d at 881.
100. 164 Mich. App. 492, 417 N.W.2d 542 (1987). Mazurkiewicz, where the court
found that no custodial environment existed, cited this aspect of the Schwiesow decision:
"[R]ecently, this Court has suggested that, in order to determine whether an established
custodial environment exists, we need to examine the circumstances surrounding the
care of the children in the years immediately preceding the divorce trial." Id. at 498, 417
N.W.2d at 545. The court found that the defendant was the children's primary caretaker
and visited regularly with the children after the parents' separation. During the mar-
riage, the plaintiff frequently relied on baby-sitters while she was away from home. Id. at
499, 417 N.W.2d at 546.
101. See supra text accompanying note 92.
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These holdings give the primary caretaker an advantage which
should not be present in a best interests analysis. The same line
of reasoning could also prevent a parent who did not serve as
primary caretaker before the divorce from establishing a custo-
dial environment after the divorce, even though that parent had
assumed all caretaker duties. Thus, these cases may be poten-
tially harmful to fathers who seek permanent custody but who
were not primary caretakers during the marriage.
III. CONCLUSIONS
Under the broad provisions of the current Michigan child cus-
tody law, Michigan courts have great discretion in determining
whether an established custodial environment exists. A tempo-
rary custody order sometimes provides the catalyst a judge
needs to find the existence of such an environment, which in
turn will determine the outcome of custody disputes. But a
judge can also view a temporary custody order as inadequate ev-
idence of an established custodial environment. Under current
case law either outcome is valid and, if accompanied by a deci-
sion properly discussing the possibility of a custodial environ-
ment, is likely to be upheld on appeal. Under these circum-
stances, attorneys and parents involved in child custody
disputes may justifiably be unsure of how to structure an argu-
ment that a custodial environment has not been created.
The strongest bar to the establishment of a custodial environ-
ment is the inherent turmoil in postdivorce periods. The parties
may think of any arrangement as temporary simply because they
have not yet restructured their lives. This time is also emotion-
ally difficult for children-they are unlikely to turn exclusively
to the parent with temporary custody for support and guidance.
Many children hope that their parents will reconcile; others
want to avoid choosing between parents. If both parents main-
tain contact with the child, it is unlikely that an established re-
lationship with either one of them will develop, regardless of a
temporary custody provision.
For these reasons, legislative reform is essential. The proposed
Model Statute, building upon current case law, offers a uniform
approach for assessing a temporary custody order when deter-
mining whether an established custodial environment exists. It
adds clarity and certainty to an otherwise ambiguous doctrine.
Because most custody decisions arising from divorce will not sat-
isfy the factors needed under the Model Statute to establish a
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custodial environment, courts can distinguish between custodial
arrangements sought through divorce and those requested
through later custody modifications. As a result, generally only
those noncustodial parents seeking to modify custodial arrange-
ments after a divorce should be required to prove the necessity
of the change through clear and convincing evidence. The
stricter standard would only apply to temporary custody situa-
tions when an established custodial environment as set forth by
the factors in the Model Statute clearly exists. The ultimate
beneficiaries of the uniformity provided by the Model Statute
would be the children.

